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Chapter I 0 
Drawing the line 
Zombies and citizens in Heinrich von 
Kleist's 'The Earthquake in Chile' 
lsak Winkel Holm 
'Behavioural note - an infected male exposed himself to sunlight today. Now 
it's possible decreased function or growing scarcity of food is causing them to 
.. . ignore their basic survival instincts. Social de-evolution appears complete. 
Typical human behaviour is now entirely absent'. In Francis Lawrence's 2007 
movie I Am Legend, Robert Neville, played by Will Smith, passes judgement on 
a so-called 'Darkseeker' whom he observed earlier the same day. Darkseekers 
are speechless mutants, vulnerable to daylight, an athletic variety of zombie 
created by a cancer cure gone awry. Three years after its introduction, a 
genetically re-engineered measles virus has wiped out 90 per cent of the human 
race, and turned the rest into Darkseekers. The virologist Neville seems to be 
the last uninfected human being on earth, an updated, biopolitical omega man 
surviving in a deserted New York City where grass has begun to sprout in the 
streets. 
Neville's behavioural note draws a line between humans and non-humans, 
between members and non-members of the community of the 'human race'. 
Since social de-evolution now appears complete, and typical human behaviour 
is now entirely absent, the humans infected by the fatal measles virus may no 
longer be judged human. Based on this judgement, Neville hunts· down the 
Darkseekers, in order to use them as test animals in his basement laboratory, 
before killing them with impunity. 
While Neville is recording his"behaviounil note, he is sitting in his basement 
laboratory dressed in the white coat of a scientist, so at first glance his judgement 
about the Darkseekers'legal status appears to be based on their objective features. 
However, a closer look reveals that there is something weirdly unscientific about 
it. It is, to say the least, surprising that Neville uses 'basic survival instincts', a 
feature common to all living beings, as the sole criterion for 'typical human 
behaviour'. It is also disturbing that he seems to pass judgement even before 
pointing out the Darkseekers' non-human lack of survival instincts. The first 
words of Neville's behavioural p.ote - 'an infected male', as opposed to 'an 
infected man' - implies his perception of the Darkseeker as a different species 
rather than as a fellow human being. Neville's use of language, rather than 
objective science alone, excludes the Darkseeker from the human race. 
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According to Neville, the Darkseekers do not count as rights-bearers: to use 
Hannah Arendt's famous description of the political refugees in the years 
preceding World War II, they experience 'the calamity of the rightless' (Arendt 
295). By highlighting the interpretation process that draws a line between rights-
bearers and rightless, between members and non-members of the political 
community, I Am ugend shifts the focus of justice from the application of the laws 
to a given community, to the constitution of the community to which the laws are 
applied. In political philosopher Nancy Fraser's terminology, built on Are11dt's 
chapter on the political refugees, the question of drawing the line between 
humans and non-humans is not a 'what' question, but a 'who' question of justice: 
At issue here is the scope of justice, the frame within which it applies: who 
counts as a subject of justice in a given matter? Whose interests and needs 
deserve consideration? Who belongs to the circle of those entitled to equal 
concern? 
(Fraser 123) 
In the contemporary avalanche of zombie movies, to which Lawrence's movie 
is related through their common descent from Richard Matheson's classical 
vampire novel I Am ugend, of 1954, this 'who' question of justice is routinely 
answered by the traditional headshot with which you put down zombies. 
The shift in focus from the application of legal norms to the constitution of 
a political community is a recurrent feature in disaster fiction, not just in zombie 
movies and related movies, such as Lawrence's I Am ugend. In this chapter, I 
leave the zombies behind, and explore the 'who' question of justice in Heinrich 
von Kleist's short story 'The Earthquake in Chile', of 1806, one of the 
foundational texts of modem disaster fiction that emerged from the rubble of 
the Lisbon earthquake, in 1 7 55. 
First, I explore what may be called the thematics of judging someone human 
or non-human. My intent is to show that Kleist's earthquake story - like 
Lawrence's disaster movie, and like a large number of zombie movies - depicts 
an act of judgement that distinguishes between the inside and outside of a political 
community, between citizens and zombies. 
Second, I focus on the srylistics of judging someone human or non-human. 
Here, I argue that the distinction between members and non-members of the 
political community seems to be connected to a certain rhetorical style, which 
I suggest be called 'prophetic' speech. In Kleist's short story, the language that 
draws the line between rights-bearers and rightless echoes the language of the 
Old Testament prophets, and this stylistic intertextuality is important to under-
standing the question of justice in the story. 
Third, and last, I discuss the aesthetics of judging someone human or non-
human. By this, I mean the relationship between the reader's aesthetic 
experience of Kleist's story, and the political act of judgement represented in 
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the story: in other words, the relationship between the 'how' question ofliterary 
form, and the 'who' question of justice. 
Here are those godless humans! 
In Kleist's short story, the earthquake that hit Santiago de Chile in 164 7 does 
not just interrupt the normal run of things; it also interrupts the normal run of 
things legal. Josefa, the daughter of a prosperous family, and Jeronimo, her 
Spanish tutor, have fallen in love, against the wishes of Josefa's father, and 
conceived a child in the garden of the convent. In seventeenth-century Chile, 
this is a crime, so the two young lovers are subjected to a strict penalty according 
to the law. However, the very momentJosefa is on her way to the scaffold to 
be beheaded, andJeronimo is on the verge of hanging himself from a pillar in 
his prison cell, the earthquake strikes, and wipes out the Chilean government 
and legal system. The viceroy's palace collapses, the archbishop's mangled body 
is found, the courthouse is in flames, and in place of the main character's father's 
house, 'there was now a seething lake from which reddish vapors were rising' 
(Kleist, The Marquise 56). Josefa and Jeronimo manage to escape from the 
crumbling city, and in the second part of the story the young family reunite in 
an idyllic valley outside the city, where they make friends with the family of the 
nobleman Don Fernando Ormez. 
In the third and final part of the story, legal proceedings against J osefa and 
Jeronimo continue, but this time in a different mode. This modified process 
takes place in a Dominican cathedral, the only church still standing in the city. 
The day after the quake, the citizens of Santiago gather in the cathedral where 
a fanatical canon, a Chorherr, interprets the earthquake as a divine punishment, 
and singles outJosefa andJeronimo as the godless sinners who have called down 
the wrath of God. 
Suddenly, the Chorherrs sermon is interrupted by a loud voice that identifies 
Josefa andJeronimo in the crowd. This triggers a release of brutal violence in 
the cathedral, and after a series of random misunderstandings, the young couple 
is killed, along with Juan, the infant child of their new friend, Don Fernando. 
In most of the older interpretations of the story, the killings in the cathedral 
are described as an outburst of uncivilized violence, a sudden regression into a 
primal state of nature. Rene Girard, in an important essay from 1985, suggests 
seeing the killings not as naked violence, but as ritual violence. According to 
Girard's interpretation, the congregation gathered in the cathedral directs its 
violence against the scapegoatedJosefa andJeronimo, in order to re-establish 
the social order (Girard). Today, researchers tend to interpret the killings in the 
cathedral as a primitive version of either. a legal process (Kaul 1 08) or a political 
process (Howe 68). 
I side with the political interpretation of the killings. The violence is neither 
'raw' nor 'ritualistic', but rather 'ethnogenetic', to use a concept of Peter 
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Sloterdijk's: the kind of violence that goes into the constitution of a political 
community (Sloterdijk). It is important to note that the voice from the crowd 
identifying Josefa and Jeronimo starts up with an invocation of the citizens of 
Santiago: 'Keep well away from them, citizens of Santiago, here are those godless 
humans' ( Weichetfem hinweg, ihr Burger von St. ]ago, hier stehen diese gottlosen Menschen.0 
(64, my translation (m.t.)). While describing the young couple as gottlosen Menschen, 
the voice simultaneously urges fellow citizens to keep their distance from them. 
And indeed, the drawing of a line between members and non-members of the 
political community takes place as a kind of ' ethnogenetic' choreography in the 
overcrowded cathedral: 'a wide circle of people backed away in horror' ( ... 
indessen sich ein weiter Kreis des Entset;::,ens um sie bildete) (64). 
Following the first voice from the frenzied crowd, the cobbler, Master Pedrillo, 
the leader of the crowd, tries to ascertainJeronimo's identity: 'Citizens [ihr Burger], 
which of you knows this young man?' (65). Moments later,J eronimo's own father 
identifies his son in a similar way: 'This is Jeronimo Rugera, Citizens [ihr Burger]' 
(66). In the end, Don Fernando's frightened son, Juan, carried at this moment 
by Josefa, reaches out to his father, and thus seems to identify him as Jeronimo. 
Once again, the identification is followed by an invocation to the citizens of 
Santiago: 'At once a voice yelled: He is the father! and another: He is Jeronimo 
Rugera! and a third: These are the blasphemers! And: Stone them! Stone them! 
The whole congregation of Christians in the temple of Jesus!' (die ganze im T ernpel 
Jesu versammelte Christenheit.~ (65, m.t.). 
Whereas the legal process in the courthouse drew a line between guilty and 
not guilty, the political process in the cathedral draws a line between members 
and non-members of the political community, between Christians and 'godless 
humans'. A guilty I non -guilty judgement in the first part of the story is succeeded 
by a judgement of human/non-human in the third part. 
It is important to note that the judgement that creates an empty space between 
members and monsters is not based on the objective features of the human 
beings prese~t in the cathedral, nor is it determined by the legal norms of Chilean 
society. Instead, judging someone human or non-human is supported by a 
network of rhetorical tropes and figures. The identification of the gottlosen Menschen 
is characterized by tropes, most often by metaphors:Josefa is a 'convent whore', 
her child is a 'bastard'. Jeronimo uses the same kind of dehumanizing rhetoric 
when he finally identifies himself, in order to save the falsely identified Don 
Fernando: 'At this Jeronimo now cried out: Stop! You monsters! If you are 
looking for Jeronimo Rugera, he is here! Set free that man, who is innocent!' 
Here, Jeronimo describes the angry crowd as 'monsters' or, literally, 'inhuman' 
(Halt! lhr Unmenschlichen). In the last pages of the story, this dehumanizing 
metaphorics is picked up by the narrator, who describes the crowd as 
'bloodthirsty tigers' and 'Satanic rabble' (66, 67). 
The invocation of political community is fuelled not by rhetorical tropes, but 
by rhetorical figures, in this case by apostrophe. The original Greek meaning 
of 'apostrophe' is 'turning away': the speaker turns away from his human 
Drawing the line 173 
addressee, in order to direct his speech to an inanimate object, a deceased person 
or an abstract concept. In this case, the voices in the crowd turn away from 
Josefa andJeronimo, and address the political community. As Jonathan Culler 
elegantly writes, 'the apostrophe makes its point by troping not on the meaning 
of a word but on the circuit or situation of the communication itself' (Culler 
135). 
In other words,Josefa andJeronimo;s legal standing is determined by a mode 
of address, as well as by a mode of seeing. \Yhen the voices from the crowd are 
'troping' (as Culler Writes) on the meaning of words, the result is the exclusion 
of the young couple as gottlosen Menschen; when the voices are 'troping' on the 
situation of the communication, the outcome is a constitution of the political 
community of Santiago. 
My claim is that Kleist's cathedral scene may be read as an early precursor 
of the zombie movie, where non-members of the human community are put 
down with a violent headshot. Kleist's version of 'ethnogenetic' violence hardly 
contains less gore than Lawrence's and Romero's. The outbreak of violence in 
the cathedral ends when Master Pedrillo drags the little Juan from Don 
Fernando's grasp, whirls the infant round in the air above the head and dashes 
him against the edge of one of the stone pillars of the cathedral. Josefa's, 
Jeronimo's, and Juan's legal standing is analogous to that of the zombies 
in George A. Romero's classical zombie movies, and of the Darkseekers in 
Lawrence's I Am .Ugend: they are politically, although not yet biologically, dead. 
In Kleist's short story, as well as in the zombie movie, the judgement drawing 
the line between humans and non-humans is based on rhetorical tropes and 
figures. In his basement laboratory, Robert Neville describes the Darkseeker as 
an 'infected male', even before he notes the lack of 'typical human behaviour'. 
In the Dominican cathedral, the Chorherr and the voices from the crowd refer 
to similar social imaginary: a network of metaphors and apostrophes supporting 
the fatal identification of non-members, and invocations to members of the 
citizenry of Santiago. 
Your hurt is incurable 
The shift in focus from the application of the laws to a given community to the 
constitution of the community to which the laws are applied may be found not 
only in zombie movies and in Kleist's earthquake story, but also in the prophetic 
books of the Bible, some of the earliest contributions to Western disaster culture. 
The Old Testament prophets - Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and Daniel, as well 
as the so-called lesser prophets - lived in catastrophic times, before the fall of 
Israel in 722 Be, andJudaea in 586 BC. They were, understandably, obsessed 
with future disasters, such as Babylonian invasions, plagues, earthquakes, and 
insect attacks. 
One hundred years ago, the sociologist Max Weber, in his workAncient]udaism, 
described the Jewish prophets as 'world-political demagogues and publicists' 
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(Weber 2 7 5). Since Weber, this interpretation of the prophets, highligh_ting ~eir 
political and social roles, has been taken up by a ·nwnber of scholars, mcludmg 
AbrahamJoshua Heschel, Andre Neher, Martin Buber, and, most recently, the 
American philosopher Michael Walzer, who, in his book In God's Shad~w, of 
2012, characterizes the prophets as 'the first social critics in the recorded h1story 
of the West' (Walzer 86). . . 
According to the political interpretation of the prophets, the Important thing 
about the Old Testament prophets is not that they predicted future disasters, 
but rather that they interpreted the existing social and political situation. 
Prophetic speech is diagnostic rather than prognostic: the prophets speak of the 
two Jewish kingdoms of Israel and Judaea, in light of future _disasters. '~he 
prophet's eye is directed to the contemporary scene', Heschel wntes, :the soCiety 
and its conduct are the main theme of his speeches' (Heschel25). Or, m Walzer's 
words, 'what makes prophecy truly significant is not the oracle, the military 
forecast but the moral admonition [ ... ] The prophet is less foreteller than censor' 
(78). In 'fact, the Greek word prophetes (of pro and phanau, 'to say, to talk') refers 
to someone uttering the truth- not necessarily someone speaking of the future. 
When the prophets direct their eyes to the contemporary scene, what they 
see is injustice. They never tire of charging the rich and mighty with not 
protecting the oppressed, the fatherless, and the widows. According to Jeremiah, 
to quote but one example of many; the Lord is made furious by the unjust ways 
of his people: 'Your hurt is incurable, I and your wound is grievous. I _There 
is none to uphold your cause, I no medicine for your wound, I no healmg for 
you' Ger. 30:12). 
According to the prophets, the injustice is a hurt to the very structure of the 
societies oflsrael andJudaea. The prophets do not teach the individual subject 
how to live an ethical life; neither do they make metaphysical claims about the 
structure of the universe. Instead, they focus on the Jewish people as a political 
community, a people tied together by the covenant into which they entered at 
Mount Sinai when they were still wandering through the desert. In other words, 
they rely on political and social ideas of justice. The unjust 'you' that God 
addresses in the quotation from the book ofJeremiah is not an individual person, 
but Israel and Jacob, that is, the Jewish people as a body politic. 
But what kind of injustice do the prophets see at the level of the political 
community? How are we to understand an incurable hurt to the body politic? 
At this point, the political interpretation of the prophets runs into a philosophical 
problem. As Weber notes, the prophets' strong sense of injustice does not 
make them dream about a reformed version of justice. They rarely refer to the 
positive laws of the two Jewish kingdoms, and never suggest new laws or ~han~es 
to old laws. They are radicals and extremists, to be sure, but not revolunonanes 
or reformists: they do not create political or social movements, they do not 
make any effort to organize their audience, they do not counsel their kings -
basically, they do not ask the generic politic question, 'What ought to be done?' 
(Walzer 85). 
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Thus, the philosophical problem is how to understand a strong sense of 
injustice that has very little to do with the substance of justice. To solve this 
problem, I suggest distinguishing between the application of the laws to a given 
community, on the one hand, and, on the other, the constitution of the political 
community to which the laws are applied. In Nancy Fraser's terminology, the 
prophets are concerned not with the 'what' question, but with the 'who' question 
of justice concerning the membership of the Jewish political community defined 
by the covenant. As Weber writes, the prophets were generally obsessed by the 
need for die judische Gernemdebildung, 'the organization of the Jewish congregation' 
(Weber 360), a need which urged them to emphasize the establishment of 'the 
decisive ritualistic barriers against the outside, in organizing the internal affairs 
of the community' (357). In the words of the contemporary Egyptologist Jan 
Assmann, the prophets perceive law as a tool with which to erect 'a high wall 
around the chosen people, a cordon sanitaire that prevents any contamination 
by, or assimilation of, the ideas and customs of the environment' (Assmann 1 7). 
It is due to their 'ethnogenetic' point of view that the prophets disregard the 
normal, run-of-the-mill discussions ofjustice in the legal systems of the two Jewish 
kingdoms. To them, justice is a problem only because the high wall between 
members and non-members of the political community has begun to crumble. 
As God says of his people, through Jeremiah, 'They have turned to me their 
back and not their face' (Jer. 32:33). Having reached the fat and fertile Canaan, 
the Jewish people have begun forgetting what it means to constitute a political 
community. They are gradually abandoning the historical moment in the desert 
when they first entered into their covenant with God. Instead, they worship 
Baal and the idols of the neighbouring tribes, they sleep with Canaanite temple 
prostitutes, they sacrifice their children, and they make burnt offerings on the 
tops of the mountains. Seen from a prophetic point of view, the body politic is 
a body on the verge of dissolution. In a situation such as this, an unjust act 
is not a criminal or an immoral act, but an act of apostasy. In Luther's translation 
of the prophetic books, the word gottlos, 'godless', is used as a German equivalent 
of the Hebrew word rasha', meaning unjust, wicked, criminal, and hostile to 
God. Being gottlos is being unjust at the level of the constitution of the political 
community. It is not so much that the gottlos person is a fellow citizen who happens 
to be in conflict with a specific law, as that he or she is a kind ofinternal enemy, 
a human being incompatible with the very principles of law. In other words, 
Gottlosigkeit is 'alegality' rather than illegality. The synonyms and metaphors for 
rasha', much cherished by the prophets, are impudent, hypocritical, stubborn, 
corrupt, and stone-hearted. 
What ought to be done, according to the prophets, is not a political 
reformation of the positive laws, but rather a 'turning back', a teshuvah, a return 
to the well-known laws of the covenant. When the prophets talk about a new 
law, the crucial question is not what should be written in this new law; it is where 
the law should be written; in the heart of the Jewish people, and not just on 
stone tablets (Jer. 31:33). 
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A flood of priestly eloquence 
Mter Josefa andJeronimo and their new friends have arrived at the Dominican 
cathedral, Kleist offers a lengthy summary of the Chorherr's sermon: 
The service began with a sermon delivered from the pulpit by one of the 
oldest canons, vested in ceremonial robes. Raising his trembling hands high 
up to heaven, with the wide folds of his surplice flowing around them, he 
began at once to give praise and glory and thanks that there should still be, 
in this part of the world that was crumbling to ruins, men and women able 
to raise up their faltering voices to God; he described how, at the will of 
the Almighty, an event had taken place that must scarcely be less terrible 
than the Last Judgement; and when, nevertheless, pointing to a crack in 
the wall of the cathedral; he called yesterday's earthquake a mere foretaste 
of that day of doom, a shudder ran through the whole congregation. From 
this point his flood of priestly eloquence bore him on to the subject of the 
city's moral depravity: he castigated it for abominations such as Sodom and 
Gomorrah had not known, and ascribed it only to God's infinite forbearance 
that Santiago had not been totally obliterated from the face of the earth. 
(63) 
This 'flood of priestly eloquence' is a flood of prophetic rhetoric based on 
some of the recurring tropes and figures of the prophetic books. Disaster is 
punishment: it does not happen by accident, but at the will of the Almighty, 
because of the city's moral depravity. And disaster is upcoming: it is not a past 
traumatic event from which the city should try to recover, but a future calamity 
that the city must work to prevent by showing moral repentance, and a 'turning 
back' to the old laws. According to the Chorherr, the crack in the wall of the 
cathedral is an omen, 'a mere foretaste of that day of doom'. Moreover, like 
the Old Testament prophets, he draws an analogy between his own city, and 
the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah (e.g. in the book of Ezekiel: 'As I live, 
says the Lord GOD, your sister Sodom and her daughters have not done as 
you and your daughters have done' (Ez. 16:48)). And, like the Old Testament 
prophets in Martin Luther's translation, the canon claims that it is only thanks 
to God's infinite forbearance that the city has not been totally obliterated, 
v"tilgt, from the face of the earth (e.g. in the book of Amos: 'the eyes of the Lord 
GOD are upon the sinful kingdom, I and I will destroy it [v~lge] from the 
surface of the ground; I except that I will not utterly destroy [ v"tilgen] the house 
ofJacob' (Am. 9:8)). 
To sum up, the Schauder, the shudder running through the whole congregation 
during the sermon, is the affective atmosphere created by prophetic speech. It 
is important to note that this example of prophetic speech is not just a piece of 
efficient rhetoric creating a certain affective response in the audience. The 
rhetoric comes with its own point of view on the question of justice. If we follow 
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Weber's political interpretation of the prophets, we must see the Clwrherr as a 
political demagogue and publicist who uses the disaster-as-punishment trope to 
propagate his views on social and sexual order. 
In his flood of priestly eloquence, the Chorherr recycles the word gottlos from 
Luther's translation of the prophetic books: 'He condemned as impious [gottlos] 
the indulgence with which it had been treated by society' (64). Here, the word 
gottws does .not describe Josefa: and Jeronimo as individual human beings, 
as gottlosen Menchen, even if the canon goes into great detail when describing 
the outrage that was perpetrated in the garden of the Carmelite convent. 
Rather, gottlos indicates the 'indulgence' (die Schonung) with which the whole city 
purportedly treated this crime. Injustice, according to the Chorherr, is an 
incurable hurt to the very structure of the society. A gottlos city is a city in which 
the social contract is out of order. In his sermon, the canon denounces the 'moral 
depravity' of the Chilean society (das Sittenverderbnis), literally translated as 'the 
corruption of the norms'. The covenant has lost its force; it is engraved on 
crumbling stone tablets, not written in the hearts of the people. Like the Old 
Testament prophets, the Chorherr has shifted the focus from the application of 
the legal norms to the constitution of the political community. 
The focus on the constitution of the political community is not· only to be 
found in the cathedral scene. Before the killings, in the second part of the story, 
the citizens of Santiago gather in the valley outside Santiago in Rousseau-ian, 
post -disaster harmony: 
And indeed, in the midst of this horrifYing time in which all the earthly 
possessions of men were perishing and all nature was in danger of being 
engulfed, the human spirit itself seemed to unfold like the fairest of flowers. 
In the fields, as far as the eye could see, men and women of every social 
station could be seen lying side by side, princes and beggars, ladies and 
peasant women, government officials and day labourers, friars and nuns: 
pitying one another, helping one another, gladly sharing anything they had 
saved to keep themselves alive, as if the general disaster had united all its 
survivors into a single family. 
(60) 
To be sure, this image of 'a paradise built in hell', to use a phrase from 
contemporary disaster research (Solnit), is the complete opposite of the Chorherr's 
denunciation of 'moral depravation', and of the short story's depiction of the 
frenzied crowd in the cathedral. The narrator praises 'the human spirit itself' 
(d" menschliche Geist selbst), a natural, flower-like precondition for social order. 
Half a page later, Jeronimo speaks to Josefa about the benign nature of 'the 
public mood' (die Stimmung d" Gemii.ter). In contrast, the canon rages against the 
'indulgence' and the 'moral depravity' (Sittenvffderbnis) of the Chilean society. 
While the young couple sees the resilience of the human community, the Chorherr 
sees the cracks in the social order. 
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Regardless of the conflicting valorizations, all the above-mentioned concepts 
- menschliche Geist, Stimmung der Gemiiter, Sittenverderbnis ~ describe the constitution 
of the political community. The Menschlichkeit in the valley collides with the 
Unmenschlichk£itin the cathedral, but both concepts refer to the Mensch as a bearer 
of rights. In other words, the second and the third parts of the story concur, in 
shifting the focus from the application of legal norms to the constitution of the 
political community. 
As John Ellis was the first to notice more than half a century ago, 'the point 
of the story lies less in the meaning of the events than in the attempts of the 
characters involved[ ... ) to make sense of them' (Ellis 14). What I want to add 
to this discussion is that the point of the story lies in offering two conflicting 
interpretations of the 'who' question of justice. Three conflicting interpretations, 
in fact, for the second part of the story juxtaposes two different images of the 
utopian political community. The human spirit seems to unfold like the fairest 
of flowers, but the story contains two versions of this unfolding. On the one 
hand is an interpretation according to which the human spirit expresses itself 
through acts of nursing, feeding, and bodily care. As we saw, the disaster survivors 
in the valley are 'pitying one another, helping one another, gladly sharing every-
thing they had saved to keep themselves alive'. According to this interpretation, 
the pre-legal community is constituted as 'one single family'. Kleist's word for 
the normative value organizing .this community is goodness, Giite, and the 
recipients of the normative orientation are, first of all, the newborn child and 
the injured victim. In modern terms, one could describe the paradisical valley 
outside Santiago as the aid worker's utopia of a well-functioning humanitarian 
camp. The second part of the story presents a different interpretation according 
to which the human spirit expresses itself in heroic deeds: 
Instead of the usual trivial tea-table gossip about the ways of the world, 
everyone was now telling stories of extraordinary heroic deeds. Persons 
hitherto held to be of little consequence in society had shown a Roman 
greatness [Romergriifie] of character. 
(60) 
Romergrijfle is presumably some kind of republican civic virtue that motivates 
heroic deeds for the common good, a word that recalls the cult of the Roman 
republic during the French Revolution (Howe 70). In this passage, then, a Mensch 
is not a vulnerable, pre-political body, but a Roman citizen. According to this 
interpretation, the human community in the valley is based on Wurde, indeed, 
a very Kantian notion of dignity that permeates the story. 
Emotional learning? 
In Human Rights in Camera, of 20 11, political theorist Sharon Sliwinski describes 
the famous 1755 Lisbon earthquake as 'one of the first great mass media events' 
(Sliwinski 38): 
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The circulation of eyewitness reports and images produced an intense 
emotional climate that provided fertile ground for the notion of a singular 
humanity, a notion that took shape in the minds of distant spectators. Indeed, 
the 1755 disaster marks one of the first instances in which subjects became 
world spectators faced with a barrage of representations of distant suffering, 
'snapshots' that elicited an imaginative and affective engagement with 
strangers at a distance. 
(45) 
According to Sliwinski, these aesthetic representations of distant suffering pre-
ceded the formal articulation of the 'Rights ofMan'. At later historical moments, 
images from Belgian Congo and Auschwitz played a similar role, training our 
ability to recognize distant victims as fellow humans: 'Our membership within 
the political community we call humanity is granted by others. One must be 
judged human - and thus be endowed with "a legal personality" ~ in order to 
enjoy the benefits of the title' (46, original emphasis). 
Sliwinski develops an argument presented by historian Lynn Hunt. In The 
Invention qf Human Rights (2007), Hunt asserts that Rousseau's Julie and 
Richardson's Pamela and Clarissa had an indisputable cultural impact, because 
they prompted a 'new learning of empathy in operation' (Hunt 42). Through 
the highly charged identification with a fictional character such as Julie, for 
instance, the eighteenth-century novel 'enabled readers to empathize across class, 
sex, and national lines' (38). In this sense, the aesthetic experience opens the 
path to human rights. According to Hunt and Sliwinski, the reading of novels 
and the viewing of graphic representations function as 'a kind of hothouse of 
emotional learning' (Hunt 55). 
While I find the thesis positing the relationship between the 'how' question 
of aesthetic experience and the 'who' question of justice convincing and 
intriguing, I doubt that it applies to a work ofliterature such as 'The Earthquake 
in Chile'. To be sure, Kleist's short story is a part of the barrage of representations 
set in motion by the Lisbon earthquake. In fact, the fictional earthquake in 
Santiago is strikingly sirllilar to the factual earthquake in Lisbon; in both cases, 
a major city is destroyed by three elements of nature: trembling earth, rising 
water, and fire (Bourke). But the proto-zombie story in the Dominican cathedral 
may hardly be described as a series of 'snapshots' that elicits the reader's 
imaginative and affective engagement with the Chorherr, with Master Pedrillo, 
or even with the wretchedJosefa,Jeronimo, andJuan. What is at stake here is 
the aesthetics of judging someone human or non-human. Kleist's prose, with its 
violent and jarring style, is anything but a hothouse of emotional learning. The 
same goes for a number of Kleist's fellow writers struggling with questions of 
human rights in disastrous situations, from Dostoevsky's Siberian prison camp, 
to Kafka's penal colony. 
The claim I make could be put in this way: in Kleist's earthquake story, the 
relation between aesthetic experience and human rights is a matter of reflection, 
rather than education. The story elicits affective disengagement, not affective 
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engagement. The multitude of fictional characters that judge one another as 
either human or non-human, either Christian Burger or gottlosen Menchen, forces 
the reader to step back from judging someone human or non-human, and instead 
to question the presuppositions underlying our capacity to determine the 'who' 
question of justice. As we have seen, these presuppositions happen to be a network 
of metaphors and apostrophes fuelling the identification of 'godless humans'. 
In the aesthetic experience, the act of judgement that draws a line between 
humans and non-humans becomes reflexive: it stops up, turns back, and makes 
palpable its own way of judging. 
Conclusion 
The morning after the quake, asjosefa andJerc;mimo leave the idyllic valley in 
the company of their new friends, they all start discussing whether it is a good 
idea to participate in the mass at the Dominican cathedral: 'Someone in Don 
Fernando's party raised the question of whether they too should not participate 
in this solemnity and join the general procession' (61). Here, precisely at the 
junction between the second and the third part of the story, the narrative slows. 
On one side of the debate is Don Fernando's sister-in-law, Dona Isabel, who 
fears the future events in the cathedral. The other side is taken by Don Fernando 
and the other members of the two families, who are all a little euphoric because 
of the social harmony in the valley. They trust the benign public mood, and 
have no fears regarding joining 'the general procession'. 
This reflective slowing of the plot is due to a vacillation between two opposing 
interpretations of the political community, a moment of indecisiveness between 
judging the citizens human and judging them non-human: is the Chilean 
community, after all, characterized by Menschlichkeit or by Unmenschlichkeit? 
We find a similar slowing down in deleted scenes of I Am Legend, now available 
as extra material on the Two-Disc Special Edition. As we have seen, Neville 
categorizes the Darkseekers as non-human. 'Social de-evolution appears 
complete. Typical human behaviour is now entirely absent', he dictates, in his 
behavioural notes. In accordance with this judgement, he is compelled to deny 
the possibility that it was the Darkseekers who set a snare trap for him. 'They 
have no higher brain function, they don't plan', he argues in a deleted scene. 
In another deleted scene, closer to the end, however, he starts to vacillate: 'Could 
they be evolving?' Is the community ofDarkseekers characterized by Menschlichkeit 
or by Unmenschlichkeit? 
It is my contention that the two families' baffled lingering in Kleist's story 
may be read as an image of the readers' aesthetic experience q{Kleist's story. 
The same goes for Neville's hesitation in I Am Legend. Like Dona Isabel, Don 
Fernando,Josefa andJeronimo, and like Neville in the deleted scenes, the reader 
cannot help but slow down and linger between two different interpretations of 
the political community, thereby not learning to perceive someone as human, 
but instead reflecting on the act of judging someone human or non-human. 
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